+(,121/,1(
Citation:
Anreas M. Petasis, Associational Standing under the
Copyright Act, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517 (2017)
Provided by:
The University of Chicago D'Angelo Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Jan 2 12:19:35 2018
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
your smartphone or tablet device

Associational Standing under the Copyright
Act
Andreas M. Petasist

INTRODUCTION

Imagine an author. One day, she sees a website that allows
users to annotate short stories in an innovative way, providing a
variety of short stories with which to experiment. As she peruses
the site, she finds that some of the stories are actually hers. She
learns that the website is run by a twenty-year-old college student
who wanted to show off his new annotation technology and who
has no commercial motive. Despite sympathizing with the student, she wants him to take down her stories. The author previously joined the Authors Guild to help her with publishing contracts,' and so she contacts the Guild's lawyer to see what help
the group can provide. The lawyer tells her that other members
have already complained about this website, but the student has
not responded to letters demanding that members' works be taken
down. He explains that it is unclear whether a class action is
available. Many authors actually support the inclusion of their
stories and prefer the extra exposure-mainly unpublished
authors who are ineligible for full membership in the Guild or
published authors who do not want to pay dues for the Guild's
services'-which makes it trickier to pursue a class action.3 It will

not be a simple case. The best option is to seek legal representation for herself and to obtain an injunction. He cautions her,
though, that even pursuing the case in her individual capacity

t BA 2013, University of Southern California; JD Candidate 2018, The University
of Chicago Law School.
1 See Legal Services (Authors Guild), archived at http://perma.cc/T6GT-KD2Y (including contract review and dispute intervention as legal services provided to members).
2 See Join the Authors Guild (Authors Guild), archived at http://perma.cc/NRR4-FY86
(listing the publication and income requirements for the various levels of membership).
3 FRCP 23 governs the certification of class actions, and it "imposes stringent requirements for certification that in practice exclude most claims." American Express Co v
Italian ColorsRestaurant, 133 S Ct 2304, 2310 (2013). See also note 243 and accompanying
text (noting that there could be problems with certifying a class when members of the
proposed class could actually benefit from the alleged infringement).
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might not be straightforward, as the case could fall within the
complicated regime of fair use and might cost thousands of dollars.4 She thinks to herself, why should she be the one to take the
risk of suing this student when there are others who know more
about this issue and have more resources than she does? Then she
wonders, why is it that the Guild cannot bring this suit for its
members, when the point of joining the Guild was to help her with
legal problems?
The situation described above is one that calls for the application of "associational standing," a long-standing legal doctrine
with a clearly delineated test. Associational standing is a type of
representational standing that allows organizations to bring suits
on behalf of their members in certain situations.5 There is an open
question, however, as to whether this doctrine applies in copyright infringement claims. Some federal courts have held that
such standing is precluded, pointing to the inability of copyright
holders to assign their legal claim or the supposed inability of
copyright infringement suits to satisfy associational standing requirements.6 Other courts have allowed associational standing in
infringement suits when the test for associational standing has
been satisfied.7
This Comment is the first scholarly work to look into this
issue in depth,8 and it concludes that associational standing
should be allowed under the Copyright Act.9 The Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the background law surrounding standing doctrine, including both associational standing
and standing under the Copyright Act. Part II describes the cases
that have dealt with associational standing under the Copyright
Act. Part III argues that associational standing should be allowed, after showing that the courts that rejected associational

4
Fair use is a doctrine that allows the unauthorized use of a copyrighted work in
certain circumstances. One of the considerations for whether this applies, for example, is
whether the alleged infringement was done for commercial purposes. 17 USC § 107.
5 See notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
See Part II.A.
6
7
See Part HI.B.
8
There are two copyright treatises that have discussed the possibility of associational standing under the Copyright Act, but not to the same extent as this Comment.
Compare Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 12.02(B)(2)
(LexisNexis 2016) (noting that "[i]t is possible ... that the [performing rights] societies
could have associational standing" in certain suits), with William F. Patry, 6 Patry on
Copyright § 21:28 (Thomson Reuters 2016) (arguing that "contrary to Nimmer's wholly
unsupported statement ... associational standing is not permitted under the Copyright Act").
9
Pub L No 94-553, 90 Stat 2541 (1976), codified at 17 USC § 101 et seq.
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standing erred in their legal analysis's and that both traditional
statutory interpretation principles and policy reasons weigh in favor of allowing such standing."
I. BACKGROUND LAW ON STANDING DOCTRINE
This Part first explains the general principles of federal
standing jurisprudence. Then, it explains the associational standing doctrine and outlines standing under the Copyright Act. Finally, it provides an example of how associational standing can fit
within copyright, specifically in regard to performing rights societies' enforcement suits.
A.

Federal Standing Jurisprudence

Every case that comes before a federal court must meet certain requirements in order to ensure there is an actual "case or
controversy" that a court has the power to adjudicate.12 One of
these requirements is called "standing.""3 Standing focuses on
"whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the
merits of the dispute or of particular issues."14 Each case must
satisfy two aspects of standing: Article III standing requirements
that pertain to whether a justiciable case exists, and prudential
standing requirements that courts use to screen out cases that
are inappropriate for a court to decide.15
The Article III requirements focus on whether the plaintiff has
a sufficient personal stake in the outcome.1 6 The basic requirements are that there is an "injury in fact," that the injury is fairly
traceable to the defendant's actions, and that the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision in court.1 7 Prudential
requirements, on the other hand, focus on avoiding cases that
involve inappropriate plaintiffs that are not screened out by

10
11

See Parts III.A-B.
See Parts III.C-D.
12 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
13 The standing requirement comes from Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. See
Friendsof the Earth, Inc v Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Ic, 528 US 167, 180
(2000) ("The Constitution's case-or-controversy limitation on federal judicial authority,
Art. III, § 2, underpins [ ] our standing ... jurisprudence.").
14 Warth v Seldin 422 US 490, 498 (1975).
15 See id ("[The standing] inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federalcourt jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.").
16

See Camreta v Greene, 563 US 692, 702 (2011) ("[T]he critical question under

Article III is whether the litigant retains the necessary personal stake.").
17

See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61 (1992).
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Article III standing.18 Some examples of prudential standing principles include the general prohibition on raising a third party's
legal rights and the norm of avoiding issues based on generalized
injuries.19 Courts have flexibility in how they apply the prudential
standing requirements, however. They are free to make exceptions and to adjust their level of scrutiny in regard to these rules,20
and courts often do not explicitly address or analyze the various
prudential requirements when discussing standing.21 As a formal
matter, though, a court must be satisfied that a party has prudential standing to proceed with the case. 22 These two parts of
standing are requirements for a court to have subject matter
jurisdiction over a case and are completely separate from the
merits of the claim-Article III and prudential standing must be
present in every case and must be supported through every stage
of litigation.23
18 There is no conclusive definition for prudential standing. See Elk Grove Unified
School District v Newdow, 542 US 1, 12 (2004) ("[W]e have not exhaustively defined the
prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine.").
19 See United States v Windsor, 133 S Ct 2675, 2686 (2013) (describing how prudential standing rules are "designed to protect the courts from decid[ing] abstract questions
of wide public significance even [when] other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary
to protect individual rights") (alterations in original and quotation marks omitted).
20 See id ("Rules of prudential standing ...
are more flexible [as compared to
Article III standing rules]."); Mills v United States, 742 F3d 400, 406-07 (9th Cir 2014)
(explaining that, though courts typically decline to hear cases belonging to third parties,
there are limited exceptions to that rule).
21 See, for example, Lujan, 504 US at 560 (explaining that some of standing's elements are "merely prudential considerations" and that the "core component[s] of standing"
are the Article III requirements, without addressing the prudential elements elsewhere in
the opinion).
22 See, for example, Bradford C. Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?,64
Case W Reserve L Rev 413, 413 (2013) ("The Supreme Court has clearly treated the
Constitution's Article III standing requirements as mandatory jurisdictional hurdles that
a plaintiff must meet for each form of relief sought before federal courts may consider the
merits of a case.").
23 See id at 561. There is some doubt, however, as to whether prudential standing
applies as part of the jurisdictional standing inquiry. See United States v JP Morgan Chase
Bank Account Number Ending 8215 in Name of Ladislao V. Samaniego, VL, 835 F3d 1159,
1167 (9th Cir 2016) ("The prudential-standing addendum to the Article III standing inquiry has fallen into disfavor in recent years. To the extent it continues to apply, we conclude that the essential requirements are satisfied here."), citing Lexmark International,
Inc v Static Control Components, Inc, 134 S Ct 1377, 1386 (2014); SuperiorMRI Services,
Inc v Alliance Healthcare Services, Inc, 778 F3d 502, 506 (5th Cir 2015) (noting that
Lexmark sees tension between prudential standing doctrine and the obligation to hear
cases within a court's jurisdiction, but nevertheless applying the prudential requirement
that a party must assert its own rights because it is "bound to follow our precedent until
the Supreme Court squarely holds to the contrary"); Mank, 64 Case W Reserve L Rev at
413 (cited in note 22) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never squarely held that prudential
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Though there are various subtleties in how to apply these
requirements when dealing with individual parties, the associational standing test, discussed in the next Section, provides a
separate way to satisfy both Article III and prudential standing.
It is specifically tailored to the unique problems that an association faces when bringing a claim on behalf of its members, and it
allows associations to demonstrate that they have standing without resorting to the normal standing inquiry. In other words, the
requirements for standing change when an association brings a
suit on behalf of its members. For example, to satisfy Article III
standing, instead of analyzing whether the association suffered
an injury in fact that is traceable to the alleged infringer's conduct
and that can be redressed in court, an association has to meet only
the respective Article III prongs of the associational standing test.
A separate, but related, inquiry is whether a statute allows a
party to bring a claim for relief in court. This is called "statutory
standing," and it is rooted in the substantive requirements of a
claim. This is separate from the typical standing inquiry rooted
in the court's subject matter jurisdiction.24 It is based on the definition of a claim, and so it is a substantive limitation that does
not involve the court's power to hear a case.25 Congress has wide
standing is a jurisdictional issue that must be decided before the merits in every single
case."). See also Bradford C. Mank, PrudentialStandingDoctrineAbolished or Waiting for
a Comeback?: Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U Pa J
Const L 213, 221 (2015):
Prior to its Lexmark decision, the Court had been inconsistent in at least two
decisions regarding whether the prudential standing doctrine was as important
as constitutional Article III standing requirements in protecting core separation
of powers principles and, therefore, whether prudential standing was a mandatory jurisdictional issue that required dismissal of a case from the federal courts
if a plaintiff's suit was contrary to prudential standing principles, although the
language in these two decisions is arguably dicta.
This Comment assumes that prudential standing is jurisdictional in nature and is still
a part of standing jurisprudence. The case that has caused the doubt in prudential standing's applicability, Lexmark, can be read as removing only the "zone-of-interests" requirement from the standing inquiry. See Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1387. Even if prudential standing no longer applies, that does not change the analysis of whether associational standing
applies as a whole, as the doctrine still implicates Article III concerns, though it might
complicate how to apply the associational standing test. See Part ILB.
24 Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 Okla L Rev
89, 91 (2009) ("[T]he concept of statutory standing applies only to legislatively-created
causes of action.. .. [I]t asks whether a statute creating a private right of action authorizes
a particular plaintiff to avail herself of that right of action.").
25 See, for example, Lexmark, 134 S Ct at 1387 n 4 ("We have on occasion referred to
this inquiry as 'statutory standing' and treated it as effectively jurisdictional. . .. But ...
'the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subjectmatter jurisdiction, i.e., the court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
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discretion in defining the availability of claims, but it is constrained by the fundamental standing inquiry in that it cannot
abrogate the Article III requirements.26 Prudential standing is
merely a background rule, however, and so prudential requirements can be abrogated by express statutory language.27 In other
words, Congress can expand or contract the pool of litigants so
long as it defines the claim in such a way that remaining potential
litigants can satisfy the constitutional requirements. Unless addressed, the prudential requirements apply as a background rule.
For example, suppose Congress passes a statute that says, in
the case of injuries resulting from a fire caused by a factory, only
residents of the local area affected by the fire can bring a suit.
Even though there might be other parties who would otherwise
satisfy the Article III requirements-maybe a visiting family
member from another state gets injured in the fire-Congress can
exclude those parties as a matter of statutory standing. Those
who are given statutory standing (the residents) must still meet
the Article III constraints, in that they still must show an injury
in fact that was caused by the fire and that can be remedied in
court. In addition, because the hypothetical statute did not explicitly say that third parties are authorized to bring suits for another
party, the prudential restriction on third parties raising the legal
rights of others still applies. On the other hand, had Congress also
provided that third parties may bring suits on behalf of those injured when the injured cannot bring suit themselves, this prudential restriction would be abrogated and would not apply to these
claims. There is no way, however, for Congress to avoid Article III
constraints.

case."'), quoting Verizon Maryland Inc v Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 US
635, 642-43 (2002).
26 See Raines v Byrd, 521 US 811, 820 n 3 (1997) ("It is settled that Congress cannot
erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing."); Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood,
441 US 91, 100 (1979) ("In no event, however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima."). The judgment of Congress might provide guidance on whether there is standing,
however. See Spokeo, Inc v Robins, 136 S Ct 1540, 1549 (2016) (discussing how Congress
has an important role in determining whether a harm is an injury in fact).
expand standing to the full ex27 See Gladstone, 441 US at 100 ("Congress may ...
tent permitted by Art. III, thus permitting litigation by one who otherwise would be barred
by prudential standing rules.") (quotation marks omitted). See also Bennett v Spear, 520
US 154, 163 (1997) ("Congress legislates against the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.").
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Associational Standing

Associational standing28 provides a way for an organization
to satisfy both Article III and prudential standing requirements
when it brings a suit on behalf of its members. The doctrine
changes the traditional inquiry described above so that the court
can deal with this unique scenario. It is a type of representational
standing, which deals with "situations in which [a] party sues as
the representative of another" party. 29 There is no transfer of legal
rights or claims between parties'O-rather, the test focuses on
whether the relationship between the parties allows an association to be a representative for its members in court. The association raises a separate claim to relief, but uses its members' legal
rights to give it standing to raise that claim. It is commonly invoked in different areas of law; for example, environmental
groups often use it to establish standing to challenge actions that
affect their members.31
Though associational standing resembles the class action
mechanism in that it involves group litigation, there are major
differences, and "the inquiry with respect to associational standing,
while similar, is not identical [to the class certification analysis]."32
A class action is a procedural device that puts together an ad
hoc group that did not exist before and that is represented by a
class representative, while associational standing is a way for a

28 Associational standing is sometimes also called "organizational standing."
See
Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Comment, Associational Standingfor Organizationswith Internal
Conflicts of Interest, 69 U Chi L Rev 351, 359 (2002). Note, however, that "organizational
standing" is sometimes instead used to describe cases in which the organization itself is
injured. See, for example, Heidi Li Feldman, Note, Divided We Fall:Associational Standing and Collective Interest, 87 Mich L Rev 733, 735 n 9 (1988).
29 See Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 Georgetown L J 1191, 1222, 1225 (2014).
Third-party standing, which allows a plaintiff to assert the rights of a third party, is another type of representational standing. See id at 1223-24.
30 The transfer of the right to sue, which this Comment calls "assignee standing," is
discussed in more detail in Part III.A.
31 See, for example, Center for SustainableEconomy v Jewell, 779 F3d 588, 596-99
(DC Cir 2015) (holding that the association had standing to seek review of the Department
of the Interior's approval of a leasing program for exploration and extraction of oil and
gas); Humane Society of the United States v Hodel, 840 F2d 45, 52-61 (DC Cir 1988) (holding that the association had standing to challenge a decision by the Fish and Wildlife
Service to expand hunting in wildlife refuges).
32 Retired Chicago Police Association v City of Chicago, 76 F3d 856, 864 (7th Cir
1996) (alteration in original and quotation marks omitted). For example, class certification
is inappropriate when class members have conflicting claims, but associational standing
is inappropriate only when there are "profound conflicts of interest," which is a much
higher threshold. See id (quotation marks omitted).
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party to demonstrate sufficient standing. These involve two different aspects of litigation, and they are not mutually exclusive.
For example, a class representative in a class action can actually
be an association, as long as the association shows it has standing
under the associational standing test to bring the suit.33 Though

associational standing allows a group to bring a claim as an association, there is only one party, the association, which brings its
own claim for relief, while a class action allows multiple third
parties' distinct claims to be resolved through the resolution of a
representative claim.
The modern version of associational standing "emerges from
a trilogy of cases" that the Supreme Court decided in the 1970s
and 1980s. 34 The first explicit recognition of associational standing came in Warth v Seldin.35 Warth dealt, in part, with the question whether a nonprofit organization can bring an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the exclusionary
effects of a town's zoning plan.36 The Court acknowledged that
"[elven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have
standing solely as the representative of its members."37 This "does
not eliminate or attenuate the constitutional requirement of a
case or controversy," as the association must still allege that at
least one of its members is "suffering immediate or threatened
injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would
make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought
suit."38 In addition, the claim must not require the individual par-

ticipation of each injured party or require individualized proof.39
If these elements are satisfied, "the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court's
jurisdiction."40
33 See, for example, In re PharmaceuticalIndustry Average Wholesale Price Litigation, 277 FRD 52, 61-63 (D Mass 2011). This is also what the Authors Guild attempted to
do in Authors Guild, Inc v HathiTrust, 755 F3d 87 (2d Cir 2014), which is discussed in
Part II.A of this Comment.
34 United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc, 517
US 544, 552-53 (1996) (describing the trilogy of cases). The trilogy consists of Warth, Hunt
v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333 (1977), and International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v
Brock, 477 US 274 (1986).
35 422 US 490 (1975). See also United Food, 517 US at 552 ("We first squarely recognized an organization's standing to bring such a suit in Warth v. Seldin.").
36 See Warth, 490 US at 493-98.
37 Id at 511.
38 Id.
39 Id at 511, 515-16.
40 Warth, 490 US at 511.
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The Court created the modern three-part test for associational standing in Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission,41 using Warth as its foundation. Hunt involved a
plaintiff association claiming that a North Carolina statute discriminated against interstate commerce when it prohibited apple
containers from bearing any grade other than the applicable US
grade.42 The Hunt Court held:
[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect
are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.41
Later cases have elaborated on the third element, clarifying that
associational standing is typically allowed only when the association seeks declaratory or injunctive relief.4 Monetary relief is almost always rejected on the grounds that it requires individual
participation (and so it fails the test's third prong), and the Supreme
Court has noted that Hunt "suggest[s] that an association's action
for damages running solely to its members would be barred for
want of the association's standing to sue" because "[individual]
participation would be required in an action for damages to an
association's members."45 There is no per se rule against associations seeking monetary relief for their members, however,46
though courts have never allowed associational standing for monetary relief based on how they apply the individual-participation
requirement.47 In addition, the third element "is best seen as
41

432 US 333 (1977).
See id at 335.
43 Id at 343. Circuit courts have sometimes articulated the first prong as requiring
that "at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own right."
Sierra Club v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 827 F3d 59, 65 (DC Cir 2016).
"
See United Food, 517 US at 553-54 ("[L]ater precedents have been understood to preclude associational standing when an organization seeks damages on behalf of its members.").
45 Id at 546.
46 See PennsylvaniaPsychiatricSociety v Green Spring Health Services, Inc, 280 F3d
278, 284 (3d Cir 2002) ("Because claims for monetary relief usually require individual
participation, courts have held associations cannot generally raise these claims on behalf
of their members.") (emphasis added); Telecommunications Research & Action Center on
Behalf of Checknoff v Allnet Communication Services, Inc, 806 F2d 1093, 1095-96 (DC Cir
1986) (Ginsburg) (noting that, though it rejected associational standing for monetary
relief, there is no per se rule against it).
47 See United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Trades No 40 v Insurance
Corp of America, 919 F2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir 1990) (noting that "no federal court has
42
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focusing on [] matters of administrative convenience and efficiency,"48 so courts have sometimes held that needing a limited
amount of individual participation does not defeat a claim of associational standing.49 Conflicts of interest within organizations
also raise barriers to associational standing under the Hunt test,
although the lower courts have not adopted a uniform approach
to applying the test in those situations.50
Finally, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace,
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v Brock51 reaffirmed the associational standing test as a separate way to
achieve a representational suit distinct from class actions. The
Court in Brock held that a plaintiff union had associational standing to challenge a Department of Labor policy after applying the
test laid out in Hunt.52 The Court refused to assent to the respondent's request to reject associational standing in favor of class action suits, finding unpersuasive the argument that associational
standing should be rejected because it does not have the same
safeguards as class actions to ensure adequate representation in
the context of this particular case.53 Instead, it looked to the

allowed an association standing to seek monetary relief on behalf of its members" because
they "have consistently held that claims for monetary relief necessarily involve individualized proof and thus the individual participation of association members, thereby running
afoul of the third prong of the Hunt test"); Sanner v Board of Trade of the City of Chicago,
62 F3d 918, 923 (7th Cir 1995) ("We are not aware of any cases allowing associations to
proceed on behalf of their members when claims for monetary, as opposed to prospective,
relief are involved."). See also Committee to Protect Our Agricultural Water v Occidental
Oil and Gas Corporation, 2017 WL 272215, *19 (ED Cal) (quoting United Union for the
same proposition). It is important to keep in mind that the issue is not that associations
will get some financial benefit from the suit, but rather that an inquiry into the extent of
damages usually requires a particularized inquiry into the specific circumstances of that
incident, and that usually requires extensive individualized participation. Whether that
is true for situations in which the damages are clear or easy to determine, such as by not
getting the appropriate public performance license from a performing rights organization
(discussed in Part ID), is unclear.
48 United Food, 517 US at 557.
49 See, for example, Alliance for Open Society International, Inc v United States
Agency for InternationalDevelopment, 651 F3d 218, 229-30 (2d Cir 2011).
50 See Edmonds, Comment, 69 U Chi L Rev at 358-66 (cited in note 28) (describing
how different courts screen for conflicts of interest in either the second prong or the third
prong of the Hunt test).
51 477 US 274 (1986).
52
See id at 281, 290.
53
See id at 288-90. The Court did note, however, that there is a real problem if an
association advances under the Hunt test but does not serve as an adequate representative
for its members, and that the Court will need to address that issue when it arises. See id
at 290. Given that there was no issue over adequate representation in Brock, the Court
did not address how to resolve such issues. See id.
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unique benefits of suits by associations that are not offered by
class actions.54 Specifically, the Court recognized that "an association suing to vindicate the interests of its members can draw
upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital" and that,
given that "the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that
they share with others,"55 "[t]he only practical judicial policy when
people pool their capital, their interests, or their activities . .. often
is to permit the association or corporation in a single case to vindicate the interests of all."56
There are other important aspects of associational standing
that need to be considered outside of these three foundational
cases. For one, these cases left open the question whether the associational standing test is a constitutional requirement that
Congress cannot do away with when legislating associational
standing issues, or whether it is "prudential and malleable by
Congress."7 The Court tackled this question in United Food and
Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v Brown Group, Inc,58
which dealt with whether the plaintiff union had standing to
bring an action under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act.59 The opinion clarifies that the first two prongs
of the Hunt test address Article III requirements, but "the associational standing test's third prong is a prudential one."6o This is
significant, because the issues discussed above in regard to the
Hunt test, such as the availability of monetary relief and the need
for individual participation, relate to this third, prudential
requirement. Thus, courts have some flexibility in how they
determine whether in specific cases the third prong precludes
monetary relief or associational standing altogether.61 The Court
also goes on to say that associational standing, as a strand of representational standing, "rests on the premise that in certain circumstances, particular relationships (recognized either by commonlaw tradition or by statute) are sufficient to rebut the background

54 See id at 289.
55 Brock, 477 US at 289-90.
56

Id at 290 (quotation marks omitted).

57 United Food, 517 US at 551.
58 517 US 544 (1996).

59

See id at 546.
Id at 555.
The Court actually emphasized the prudential nature of this requirement even in
regard to damages claims, noting that "[r]epresentative damages litigation is common." Id
at 557.
60
61
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presumption (in the statutory context, about Congress's intent)
that litigants may not assert the rights of absent third parties."62
This means that the typical prudential bar in raising a third
party's claim does not apply to associational standing.
In addition, despite the fact that only one claim is resolved
when an association brings a claim, there is the possibility that
an association's claim will preclude its members' subsequent
claims. The principles of res judicata, specifically claim preclusion, should normally apply to restrict an association's members
from bringing separate claims after the resolution of the association's claim. Under claim preclusion, a final judgment on the
merits of a claim precludes relitigating that same claim brought
by the same parties. Sometimes, though, nonparties can be precluded, and one such exception is when a nonparty is "adequately
represented by someone with the same interests who [wa]s a
party to the suit."63 Given that the basis of associational standing

is that the association serves as a representative of its members'
interests when certain requirements are met, claim preclusion
should arguably apply to any subsequent suits brought by the
association's members. The test for associational standing, however, does not guaranteeadequate representation for the purposes
of claim preclusion.64 For example, courts have said that a member's claim for damages is not precluded after an association
brought a claim for injunctive or declaratory relief, because the
association's interests and the member's interest were not aligned
given that the association could not seek monetary relief.65

62 United Food, 517 US at 557 (citations omitted).
63 Taylor v Sturgell, 553 US 880, 893-94 (2008) (alteration in original and quotation
marks omitted). Representation is adequate for preclusion only if "(1) [t]he interests of the
nonparty and her representative are aligned, and (2) either the party understood herself
to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the
interests of the nonparty." Id at 900 (citations omitted).
64 See United Food, 517 US at 556 n 6 ("The germaneness of a suit to an association's
purpose may, of course, satisfy a standing requirement without necessarily rendering the
association's representation adequate to justify giving the association's suit preclusive effect as against an individual ostensibly represented."); Brock, 477 US at 290 ("Should an
association be deficient [in regard to whether it is an adequate representative for its injured members], a judgment won against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the
association's members without offending due process principles.").
65 See, for example, Harrisv County of Orange, 682 F3d 1126, 1133-34 (9th Cir 2012)
("[W]e conclude that claim preclusion does not bar a second action for damages, where a
damages remedy was unavailable in the first action.. . . We find that the interests of [the
association and the members] are not aligned because associational standing rules prevent
[the association] from pursuing damages."). It should be noted, though, that this assumes
that an association is barred altogether from seeking monetary relief. This is true in a

2017]

Associational Standing under the Copyright Act

1529

To summarize, the associational standing test described in
Hunt is a mix of constitutional and prudential standing requirements that provides a separate and distinct way to establish
standing for organizations bringing a claim on behalf of their
members. When the requirements for associational standing are
met, this overcomes the presumption that a party cannot assert
the legal rights of a third party. This is the default rule.66 For
example, though the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 197467 (ERISA) allows only plan participants and beneficiaries
to bring a claim, courts have allowed associational standing for
ERISA claims.68 Congress can, however, define claims in a way
that prevents associational standing from being applied so as to
reverse this default rule-this would be a statutory standing issue, not a constitutional or prudential standing issue. The Tenth
Circuit, for example, concluded that the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 193869 barred unions from bringing liability suits, regardless of
whether they could meet associational standing requirements.70
The relevant question for associational standing, therefore, is
whether the Copyright Act precludes associational standing altogether in copyright infringement suits as a matter of statutory
standing. It comes down to whether Congress in the statute has
defined copyright infringement claims in a way that prevents the
associational standing test from being applied altogether.

functional sense given how Hunt is applied, but as a formal matter, a court could theoretically find that an association can seek monetary relief, though this has never happened.
66 See, for example, Doe v Stincer, 175 F3d 879, 882 (11th Cir 1999) ("It has long been
settled that an organization has standing .. . without a statute explicitly permitting associational standing.").
67 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified at 29 USC § 1001 et seq.
68 See, for example, Southern Illinois Carpenters Welfare Fund v CarpentersWelfare
Fund of Illinois, 326 F3d 919, 922 (7th Cir 2003) ("[W]e do not think that by confining the
right to sue ... to plan participants and beneficiaries Congress intended to prevent unions
from suing on behalf of participants."). See also Borrero v United Healthcareof New York,
Inc, 610 F3d 1296, 1305 (11th Cir 2010) (listing the courts that have allowed associational
standing under ERISA). The statute stated only that "[a] civil action may be brought by a
participant or beneficiary." 29 USC § 1132(a)(1).
69 52 Stat 1060, codified at 29 USC § 201 et seq.
70 See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1564 of New Mexico v
Albertson's, Inc, 207 F3d 1193, 1201-02 (10th Cir 2000) ("The question [ ] of organizational
standing generally is irrelevant in light of the specific statutory bar on representative
actions under the FLSA."). The statute stated that "[a]n action to recover the liability prescribed [for violations]. . . may be maintained against any employer .. .by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 USC § 216(b).
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Standing under the Copyright Act

Section 501(b) of the Copyright Act states that "[t]he legal or
beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled
. .. to institute an action for any infringement of that particular

right committed while he or she is the owner of it."71 In turn, § 101
defines a "copyright owner" of an exclusive right as "the owner of
that particular right."72 The list of "exclusive rights" in § 106 of
the Act is considered exhaustive by some courts. 73 This definition
of "owner" extends only to copyright owners and exclusive licensees,7 4 so "strangers and nonexclusive licensees cannot bring suit
to enforce a copyright."76 A "beneficial owner" is defined as the
original copyright owner who no longer has legal title over the
exclusive right after transferring it to another party. 76
The fact that "[t]he statute does not say expressly that only a
legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right is entitled to sue"
has led to questions as to who can bring a copyright infringement
suit.77 This is important, because whether the Copyright Act
allows for associational standing depends on whether Congress
defined the claim in such a way as to preclude associations. In
other words, it is a matter of statutory standing.
Cases involving the assignability of the right to sue for copyright infringement provide some guidance on the Act's statutory
standing as defined in § 501(b), though arguably not much.78 They
deal with the most relevant question for the associational standing issue: Who is allowed to bring a suit under the Act? If, as the
following case holds, § 501(b) limits statutory standing to only
legal or beneficial owners to the exclusion of everyone else, that
71 17 USC § 501(b). The Act also requires the copyright to be preregistered or registered before an infringement claim can be instituted. 17 USC § 411(a).
72 17 USC § 101.
73 See, for example, Minden Pictures, Inc v John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 795 F3d 997,
1002 (9th Cir 2015), citing Silvers v Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc, 402 F3d 881, 88384 (9th Cir 2005).
74 An owner can transfer an exclusive right to someone else only according to specific
requirements. See 17 USC § 201(d). Both "an assignment (which transfers legal title to the
transferee) or an exclusive license (which transfers an exclusive permission to use to the
transferee) qualifies as a 'transfer' of a right in a copyright," and so "any party to whom
such a right has been transferred .. . has standing to bring an infringement action based
on that right." Minden Pictures, 795 F3d at 1003.
75 Sybersound Records, Inc v UAV Corp, 517 F3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir 2008).
76 See Moran v London Records, Ltd, 827 F2d 180, 183 (7th Cir 1987) (describing
how the 1909 Copyright Act used common-law trust principles to determine who was a
beneficial owner and how Congress merely codified this case law in the 1976 Act).
77 Silvers, 402 F3d at 885 (emphasis in original).
78 See Part III.A.
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arguably precludes associational standing, given that associations are not the owners of the copyrights involved in these
claims. It is important to keep in mind, however, that there are
issues with analogizing from assignability cases to the associational standing cases. 79 Courts consider them relevant because
they interpret the Act's statutory standing limitations, but the
assignability cases present distinct issues from the associational
standing cases.
The most recent analysis on the assignability of the right to
sue is in Silvers v Sony PicturesEntertainment, Inc.80 In Silvers, an

author wrote a script under a work-for-hire agreement that gave
the studio the copyright to the script. She later received the right
to sue for copyright infringement regarding that script, but did
not receive the underlying copyright.81 The initial Ninth Circuit
panel allowed the author to pursue the claim, stating that
"[n]othing in the statute prohibits the legal or beneficial owner of
the exclusive right under copyright from assigning an accrued
cause of action for infringement of that right."82 The court reviewed the case en banc, however, and reversed the earlier opinion, holding that "[t]he bare assignment of an accrued cause of
action is impermissible under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b)."83 It reached
this conclusion because "[t]he right to sue for an accrued claim for
infringement is not an exclusive right under § 106" and interpreted § 501(b) as allowing only a legal or beneficial owner of exclusive rights under § 106 to bring a suit, despite the fact that the
text does not explicitly say this.84 The Silvers en banc majority
faced heavy criticism for its interpretation.85

See id.
80 402 F3d 881 (9th Cir 2005). See also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case
against Copyright Trolls, 86 S Cal L Rev 723, 736 (2013) ("Silvers v. Sony Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. is the leading case on [whether the right to sue is assignable]."). The
question is arguably still open in other circuits, though, despite the prominence of this
case. See Viesti Associates, Inc v Pearson Education, Inc, 2014 WL 1053772, *6 (D Colo)
("Although the Tenth Circuit has not decided this specific issue, the weight of authority
interprets § 501(b) as authorizing suit only by legal or beneficial owners.").
81 Silvers, 402 F3d at 883.
82 Silvers v Sony PicturesEntertainment, Inc, 330 F3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir 2003).
83 Silvers, 402 F3d at 890.
84 Id at 884-85.
85 See Ian Polonsky, You Can't Go Home Again: The Righthaven Cases and Copyright
Trolling on the Internet, 36 Colum J L & Arts 71, 84 (2012) ("The decision in Silvers has
been met with harsh criticism, both on the bench and in academic circles."); Silvers, 402
F3d at 891 (Berzon dissenting) ("The majority opinion [ ] is internally inconsistent, provides inadequate support for its conclusion, and ignores our analogous precedents.").
79
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The court made two interpretative choices that are relevant
to associational standing under the Copyright Act. First, the opinion concluded from a Supreme Court patent infringement case
that there was a presumption against applying common-law
standing doctrine in intellectual property cases. 86 Whether there
is such a presumption is a question discussed in Part III.C.
Second, the en banc court distinguished an earlier Fifth
Circuit opinion that allowed for the assignability of copyright
infringement claims and instead followed two Second Circuit
opinions that reached a different conclusion. The Fifth Circuit in
Prather v Neva Paperbacks, Inc87 said that to assign accrued
causes of action for copyright infringement, "[a]ll that is required
is that the contract cover in no uncertain terms choses in action
for past, prior, accrued damages."88 The Second Circuit, however,
stated in Eden Toys, Inc v Florelee Undergarment Co, Inc89 that
"[w]e do not believe that the Copyright Act permits holders of
rights under copyrights to choose third parties to bring suits on
their behalf."90 Later, in ABKCO Music, Inc v HarrisongsMusic,
Ltd,91 the Second Circuit allowed the assignment of accrued
claims when both the copyright and the causes of action were
transferred.92 The Ninth Circuit interpreted these two Second
Circuit cases as establishing that a party without an ownership
interest has no standing to sue. 93 It found them more persuasive
than Pratherbecause its "independent analysis [led the court] to
the same conclusion" and because it wanted to avoid creating a
circuit split in copyright.94 The Ninth Circuit also distinguished
Pratherby acknowledging that the case was decided before the
1976 Copyright Act, which enacted the language in § 501(b),95 and
in its view Pratherinvolved a transfer of what would be considered exclusive rights under

§ 106.96

86 See Silvers, 402 F3d at 887-88, citing Crown Die & Tool Co v Nye Tool & Machine
Works, 261 US 24, 26, 33-35 (1923).
87 410 F2d 698 (5th Cir 1969).
88 Id at 700.
89 697 F2d 27 (2d Cir 1982).
90 Id at 32 n 3.
91 944 F2d 971 (2d Cir 1991).
92 See id at 980-81.
93 See Silvers, 402 F3d at 890.
94 Id.
95 See Copyright Act of 1976 § 501(b), 90 Stat at 2584, 17 USC § 501(b).
96 See Silvers, 402 F3d at 889.

2017]

AssociationalStanding under the CopyrightAct

1533

Thus, the result reached in Silvers weighs in favor of requiran
ownership interest in a copyright to allow a claim of ining
fringement based on that copyright. This has impacted later cases
dealing with associational standing, because such an interpretation might preclude associational standing as a matter of statutory standing.97 Whether the assignability cases do in fact provide
guidance on the associational standing issue is discussed in
Part III.A.
D.

An Example: The Standing of Performing Rights Societies

Though there are a wide variety of organizations that could
desire associational standing under the Copyright Act in order to
more effectively serve their membership bases,98 copyright infringement suits brought by performing rights societies, or performing rights organizations (PROs), best illustrate how associational standing can fit under the Copyright Act's standing regime.
Though PROs frequently bring actions in courts to protect their
members' copyrights, whether they even have standing to do this
is actually an unresolved problem, as courts have never discussed
applying associational standing in these situations.
A "performing rights society" is defined as "an association,
corporation, or other entity that licenses the public performance
of nondramatic musical works on behalf of copyright owners of
such works, such as the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and
SESAC, Inc."99 These organizations play an integral role in the
licensing scheme of the modern music industry, as they make
blanket licensing for songs possible. The Supreme Court in particular has emphasized the importance of PROs in the modern
music industry, describing how such organizations reduce the
costs of monitoring and enforcing individuals' copyrights.100 To
this day, PROs are active in bringing lawsuits enforcing the public

97 There are issues with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, however. See id at 90711 (Bea dissenting) (describing how the majority misinterpreted Prather, Eden Toys, and
ABKCO).
98 For example, the Authors Guild described in the opening hypothetical exists to
help authors with a variety of issues, including legal problems. Associational standing
could allow them to more effectively provide legal services to their members. See note 1.
99 17 USC § 101.
100 See Broadcast Music, Inc v Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc, 441 US 1, 2021 (1979).
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performance rights of the copyright holders who have included
their works in the PRO catalogues.o1
Despite the prevalence of these lawsuits, these organizations
do not actually have standing based on any theory of copyright
ownership, as they are merely nonexclusive licensees of the copyright holders and, as stated in Part I.C, they are therefore not entitled to the right to sue. 0 2 This creates an awkward situation,
because
[t]he cumulative effect of these various laws and rights is that
while ASCAP [ust like the other PROs] bears the primary
responsibility for enforcing its members' copyrights and has
authority to bring enforcing lawsuits on behalf of its members, it must remain a non-exclusive licensee and, therefore,
cannot bring the suit in its own name.103
Courts often do not even confront whether PROs have standing,
however,104 and some courts simply allow the PROs to proceed
based on conclusory assertions.105 This is a major problem: How can

PROs depend on the courts to give them standing to bring these
claims when courts have been so inconsistent on this question?
This is exactly the type of problem associational standing is
meant to fix, and PROs seem to meet the requirements of the test.
Their members (the individual copyright holders) will certainly
have standing in cases of infringement of their copyrights, so the
first prong of the Hunt test is met. These enforcement suits would
also be germane to a PRO's purposes, as a PRO's whole function
is to maintain a public performance licensing scheme, which presumably includes enforcement of the licenses too. The second

101 See Sergio Bichao, BMI Song Lawsuits Make Rounds in Jersey Bars (USA Today,
June 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/G3W4-QNCD.
102 See GraniteMusic Corp v Center Street Smoke House, Inc, 786 F Supp 2d 716, 724
(WDNY 2011) ("Further, because ASCAP's right to license public performances of the
musical compositions within its repertoire is nonexclusive, ASCAP is without standing to
bring this action."); BroadcastMusic, Inc v CBS Inc, 1983 WL 1136, *6-7 (SDNY) ("I conclude that BMI lacks the standing to sue CBS for copyright infringement... . The fact that
remedying a procedural requirement may be awkward does not change the fact that BMI
is in fact confronted with a procedural requirement.").
103 Ocasek v Hegglund, 116 FRD 154, 157 (D Wyo 1987).
104 See, for example, BroadcastMusic, 1983 WL 1136 at *6 ("There are reported cases
in which BMI has apparently sued for copyright infringement in respect of music in its
repertory. However, the question of BMI's standing to do so was apparently not raised by
the alleged infringer.").
105 See, for example, BroadcastMusic, Inc v McDade & Sons, Inc, 928 F Supp 2d 1120,
1130 (D Ariz 2013) ("The non-exclusive nature of BMI's licensing agreements, however,
does not deprive BMI of the right to enforce the copyrights at issue.").
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Hunt prong is therefore satisfied. The individual-participation
prong provides the toughest issue, but even there the PROs have
a strong argument that individual participation is not required.
The individual copyright holder does not need to participate to
show that the alleged infringer publicly performed her copyrighted song without a license; all that needs to be shown is that
there was a public performance and that the PRO never gave the
license to do this. The fact that PROs already engage in these
suits without individual copyright holder participation supports
this view.106 Even if this was a close issue, courts would have flexibility in how to apply this third prong, as discussed above. Given
the benefits that PROs provide to the music industry, there are
strong policy reasons to hold that the prudential third prong is
satisfied and to allow for associational standing in this context.
The question remains, however, whether the Copyright Act even
allows such organizations to rely on the doctrine.107
II. THE ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING CASES

This Part summarizes the cases that have rejected associational standing and the main cases that have allowed for associational standing in copyright infringement suits. Courts that rejected associational standing held either that § 501(b) precludes
associational standing altogether based on the reasoning provided in the assignability cases discussed above or that a copyright infringement claim can never satisfy the associational
standing test laid out in Hunt. The courts that allowed for associational standing, on the other hand, simply apply the doctrine
and defend how they apply it, without explaining whether it is
appropriate to allow associational standing in the first place.
A.

Courts That Have Rejected Associational Standing

Authors Guild, Inc v HathiTrust108 rejected associational
standing for copyright infringement suits. In HathiTrust, Google
created digital copies of works found in university libraries,
retaining copies for itself for its Google Books project while also

106 This would also arguably be true for suits for damages, though no court has held
that a damages suit is justified under the Hunt test. See text accompanying notes 44-47.
107 Previous scholarship has also suggested that PROs could potentially have associational standing. See Nimmer and Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright at § 12.02(B)(2) (cited
in note 8).
108 755 F3d 87 (2d Cir 2014).
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providing the universities with their own digital copies.109 The
universities then contributed their digital copies to the HathiTrust
Digital Library (HDL), a digital library that the universities collectively founded in which all participating institutions' digital
copies are accessible."1 Plaintiffs, including various domestic and
foreign associations like the Authors Guild and the Australian
Society of Authors Limited, brought a claim of copyright infringement against the universities and HDL for these reproductions."'
The Southern District of New York found that the associational plaintiffs satisfied the Hunt test, but rejected associational
standing under its interpretation of the Copyright Act."2 Specifically, it concluded the associations lacked statutory standing as
only legal or beneficial owners can bring a claim for copyright infringement."1 Though the opinion acknowledged that associational standing under the Copyright Act was a novel issue,"4 it
found guidance in Silvers, ABKCO, and Eden Toys, cases that
dealt with the assignability of the right to sue and deal in relevant
part with the question of who is allowed to sue."5 The court also
argued that, because copyright is meant to provide only a limited
monopoly to encourage creativity, Congress did not intend for
third-party enforcement of those rights as a matter of statutory
standing, even though associational standing would have applied
otherwise.116

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling without reconsidering the issue.17 It quickly dismissed the notion that
associations could have standing to bring copyright infringement
claims on their members' behalf,118 merely quoting ABKCO for the

proposition that "the Copyright Act does not permit copyright
holders to choose third parties to bring suits on their behalf."119
The Central District of California also held that associations
do not have standing under the Copyright Act in Association for
Information Media and Equipment v Regents of the University of
109 See Authors Guild, Inc v HathiTrust, 902 F Supp 2d 445, 448 (SDNY 2012).
110 See id.
111 See id at 447.
112 See id at 450-54.
"3 See HathiTrust, 902 F Supp 2d at 452-54.
114 Id at 453 ("Courts in the Second Circuit have not explicitly addressed the issue of
whether associational standing is permissible under the Copyright Act.").
" See id.
116 See id.
117 HathiTrust, 755 F3d at 94.
118 See id.

119 Id.
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California12o ("AIME"). The case involved two plaintiffs, Ambrose
Video Publishing (AVP), an educational video producer, and the
Association for Information Media and Equipment (AIME), a national trade association that seeks to ensure copyright compliance. 121 The plaintiffs alleged that UCLA copied DVDs licensed by
AVP and other AIME members and put the content on the Internet,
allowing people with access to the UCLA network to access this
content. 122 In regard to the issue of associational standing, the
court held that the participation of the individual copyright
owners was necessary (and thus the organization fails the third,
prudential, prong of the Hunt test), as the individual owners have
to prove ownership of the copyright to establish copyright infringement.123 The court rejected the argument that declaratory
relief does not require individualized participation of the members, because "the scope of that declaratory relief would be limited
by the rights that members have over the copyrights."124 This
means that each member would have to show the rights they had
over their individual copyrights, which would necessitate individual participation. Thus, according to the court, the third prong of
the Hunt test cannot be satisfied in a copyright infringement suit.
Therefore, two cases rejected associational standing under
the Copyright Act: the HathiTrustcase reasoned that Congress did
not intend for associational standing to be included in the copyright
regime, and the AIME case held that no copyright infringement
action could satisfy the associational standing test because such
an action would always require individual participation.
B.

Courts That Have Allowed Associational Standing

In contrast, other federal courts allowed for associational
standing under the Copyright Act. Though there are a handful of
cases in which associational standing was allowed in a copyright
infringement suit, this Section will only focus on three court opinions: the lone circuit-court opinion that allows for associational
standing and two district-court opinions that provide analyses
relevant to the concerns raised by the courts in Part II.A.125
120 2011 WL 7447148 (CD Cal).
121 Id at *1.
122 Id.
123 Id at *4.

124 See AIME, 2011 WL 7447148 at *4.
125 There are at least three other cases that have either allowed for associational
standing or that have applied the Hunt test in a copyright infringement claim. See Itar-Tass
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The Eleventh Circuit in CBS Broadcasting, Inc v EchoStar
Communications Corp126 held that plaintiff associations had
standing in a copyright infringement claim based on the Satellite
Home Viewer Act of 1988127 (SHVA), which gave satellite carriers
a compulsory license to retransmit copyrighted network programming to "unserved households."128 It also created a claim actionable
as copyright infringement under § 501(b) for retransmitting
works to ineligible subscribers.129 Network stations and affiliate
associations (that is, associations of affiliate network stations)
brought such a claim against EchoStar.130 The district court found
EchoStar liable, but both sides were unsatisfied with the result
and appealed the decision.131
The circuit court addressed the standing issue in a footnote.132
a
In brief paragraph, the court stated that "[i]ndividual affiliate
stations have standing pursuant to 17 U.S.C.

§ 501(e)."133

Sec-

tion 501(e) states that a network station will be treated like a
legal or beneficial owner under § 501(b) when its rights under the
SHVA are violated.134 This puts a network station (such as the
affiliate network stations in this case) on the same footing as individual copyright holders who can bring a claim under § 501(b),
so it merely means that network stations can bring a suit under
§ 501(b). This does not change the associational standing question: whether § 501(b) allows associations of individuals (in this
case, individual network stations) to bring copyright infringement claims through associational standing. The district court

Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc, 1997 WL 109481, *10-11 (SDNY) (allowing
for associational standing for a copyright infringement action filed by a Russian professional writers union); NationalAssociation of Freelance Photographersv Associated Press,
1997 WL 759456, *4-5 (SDNY) (applying the Hunt test in a copyright infringement suit,
but ultimately rejecting standing because of the need for individual participation over how
the defendant's practice of endorsing checks and transferring copyrights affected each
plaintiff); Authors League of America, Inc v Association of American Publishers, 619 F
Supp 798, 804-06 (SDNY 1985) (allowing associational standing in a challenge to the
manufacturing clause of the Copyright Act, though eventually dismissing the claim on the
merits).
126 450 F3d 505 (11th Cir 2006).
127 Pub L No 100-667, 102 Stat 3949, codified at 17 USC § 119 et seq.
128 See CBS Broadcasting, 450 F3d at 510.
129 See 17 USC § 119(a)(7)(A).
130 See CBS Broadcasting, 450 F3d at 508-09.
131 See id at 517.
132 See id at 517 n 25.
133 Id.
134 See 17 USC § 501(e).
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reasoned that the affiliate network associations had standing because the members of these associations, the affiliate network
stations, had standing under § 501(e) and § 501(b),135 and the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with this analysis.136
In the second case, the Northern District of Iowa in Olan
Mills, Inc v Linn Photo C0137 allowed a society of professional

photographers to bring a copyright infringement action. Olan
Mills, an operator of over a thousand portrait studios around the
country, informed Linn Photo-a company that, among other
things, reproduced photographs-of its belief that Linn Photo was
infringing its copyrights.138 In 1987, Olan Mills took photos of its
employees and registered its copyright in four of the photographs.139 Then the company hired a private investigator to conduct an investigation to see whether Linn Photo would reproduce
these photographs.140 Per the investigator's request, Linn Photo
reproduced and enlarged each of these photos in different stores
that were visited.141 Based on these facts, Olan Mills and the
Professional Photographers of America, Inc (PPA) brought a
copyright claim and sought declaratory relief to prevent Linn
Photo from reproducing their photographs.142
In an earlier order, the district court found that PPA had associational standing, and in this opinion the court discussed that
finding. In that earlier order, the court reasoned:
Cases cited by the parties to the effect that only copyright owners or exclusive licensees have standing to sue for copyright
infringement, see Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment
Co., 697 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1982), do not resolve the standing issue presented by this motion since PPA's members are

135 See CBS Broadcasting,Inc v EchoStar Communications Corp, No 98-2651, slip op
at 12 (SD Fla Mar 31, 2003).
136 CBS Broadcasting,450 F3d at 517 n 25 (noting briefly that "Affiliate Associations
meet the requirements for representational standing under Hunt"). It should be noted that
a later district-court opinion in the Eleventh Circuit did not acknowledge that the Eleventh
Circuit had addressed this question. See BroadcastMusic, Inc v PRB Productions,Inc, 2014
WL 3887509, *2 n 1 (MD Fla).
137 795 F Supp 1423 (ND Iowa 1991).
138 See id at 1426.
139 See id.
140 See id at 1426-27.
141 See Olan Mills, 795 F Supp at 1427.
142 See id at 1428-29.
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the copyright owners, and since the requirements of associational standing are otherwise met.14s
Thus, the court did not find associational standing precluded
under the Copyright Act, and it rejected the application of Eden
Toys in the context of associational standing.1"4
Finally, in Authors Guild v Google, Inc,145 the Southern
District of New York allowed for associational standing based on
its application of the Hunt test. This case is based on the same
general set of facts as HathiTrust, in which the Second Circuit
rejected associational standing: Google created an online database of books scanned from major research libraries, and in response authors brought a class action copyright infringement suit
against Google.146 In a motion to dismiss, Google argued that the
associational plaintiffs lacked standing to act as representatives
in the class action.147 In its opinion, the district court stated that
there was no dispute that the associations satisfied the first two
prongs of the Hunt test, so it focused on how to apply the third
prudential prong involving the individual participation of the
associations' members.148

143

Id at 1427-28.

The opinion goes on to say that the court made no statement as to whether there
would be associational standing in the context of a summary judgment motion and limited
its prior holding to one based on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id at 1428. The
opinion was in response to a summary judgment motion, and there was no evidence that
the other members of the association registered their copyrights, making declaratory relief
inappropriate. See id at 1429. This does not undermine the earlier order's conclusion, however, because on the pleadings' face the court decided that, if the copyrights of all the
relevant plaintiffs were registered and part of the case at issue, then associational standing would have been proper. See id at 1428-29 (stating that it was reasonable to infer that
the members of the PPA registered their copyrights from the pleadings, but that at summary judgment that was a different issue). The Eighth Circuit later reversed this grant of
summary judgment to Linn Photo but never discussed the issue of standing nor even the
existence of the PPA as a plaintiff. See generally Olan Mills, Inc v Linn Photo Co, 23 F3d
1345 (8th Cir 1994).
145 282 FRD 384 (SDNY 2012).
146 See id at 386. Interestingly enough, both of these cases were decided in the same
year, with the Google district court releasing this opinion in May 2012, while the HathiTrust
district court released its opinion in November. Compare HathiTrust, 902 F Supp 2d at
445, with Google, 282 FRD at 384. The HathiTrust district court recognized that the Google
district court concluded that the associations satisfied the Hunt test and agreed with its
reasoning, but went on to argue that associational standing was precluded as a matter of
statutory standing, which was not addressed by the Google district court.
144

See Google, 282 FRD at 388.
148 See id at 389-91.
147
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The court reasoned that only limited individual participation
would be needed to establish the elements of the copyright infringement claim.149 First, the court noted that, because the copying was undisputed, individual participation for that element was
not required.150 Then the court noted that "[flor those association
members who still own all or part of the copyright to their work,"
individual participation is not required because that information
can be found in the US Copyright Office's Registry, especially because "copyright registrations [are] prima facie evidence of copyright ownership."151 Those members who retained a beneficial interest in their work would require some individual participation,
but the degree required "does not defeat associational standing."152

The court also rejected the argument that the fair use defense
would require individual participation, because "[t]he [c]ourt
could effectively assess the merits of the fair-use defense with respect to [subgroups of association members' works] without conducting an evaluation of each individual work,"153 and rejected the
notion that individual participation would be required at the relief stage, as the plaintiffs were only seeking injunctive relief.154
Finally, the court reasoned that because the third prong is prudential, it "has a certain degree of discretion in granting associational standing where, as is undisputedly the case here, the first
two prongs are met."155 The court considered the advantages in

associational standing, the fact that the Authors Guild had been
involved in the litigation for almost seven years, and how "it
would be unjust to require that each affected association member
litigate his claim individually" in holding that the associations
had standing.156
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the Second
Circuit, as a result of HathiTrust, discussed in Part II.A, has effectively held that associational standing is precluded as a matter
149 The two elements are "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." See id at 389-90 (quotation marks omitted). The opinion does not actually discuss the limiting language in § 501(b) in its analysis.
See generally id.
150 See id at 390.
151 Google, 282 FRD at 390.
152 Id. The court explained that "[riequiring some individual members to present
documentary evidence of their beneficial copyright interest would not make this case
administratively inconvenient or unmanageable." Id.
153 Id.

154 See id at 391.
155 Google, 282 FRD at 391.
156 Id.
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of statutory standing.157 It did so, however, without acknowledging
the Google district court's reasoning here. Indeed, the HathiTrust
district court that rejected associational standing as a matter of
statutory standing actually agreed with the Google district court's
analysis that the Hunt test is otherwise satisfied.158 Thus, this
analysis is still relevant in the sense that it provides guidance on
how to apply the Hunt test, regardless of whether statutory
standing precludes associational standing.
III. THE CASE FOR AsSOCIATIONAL STANDING

This Comment concludes that associational standing should
be allowed under the Copyright Act. First, it explains why assignee standing should not provide guidance on associational
standing. Then it examines the errors of the courts that have rejected associational standing. Finally, this Comment argues that
statutory interpretation principles and policy issues indicate that
associational standing should be available.
A.

Assignee Standing Does Not Provide Guidance on
Associational Standing

The statutory standing restriction against assigning the right
to sue does not necessarily extend to whether there is a similar
restriction against associational standing. First, as a formal matter, these are two distinct legal issues. Assignments of legal
claims to a third party involve one party assigning the right to
sue for a legal claim to another party, as discussed in Part I.C.
Associational standing, on the other hand, is a type of representative suit that "does not stem from any actual assignment of rights,
but hinges on the relationship between the association and the
interests of its members."159 Representative suits do not depend
on whether the third party was assigned any interest (ownership
interest or otherwise), but rather deal with overcoming the
prudential restriction against having a third party raise another's

157 In the later appeal of the Google district-court case, the Second Circuit rejected the
finding of associational standing in a quick footnote that reaffirmed its stance on statutory
standing under the Copyright Act. See Authors Guild v Google, Inc, 804 F3d 202, 208 n 1
(2d Cir 2015) ("[I]n a separate case, this court found that, under the Copyright Act, the
Authors Guild lacks standing to sue for copyright infringement on its members' behalf.").
The court cited its HathiTrustopinion but did not acknowledge the district court's application of the Hunt test. See Google, 804 F3d at 208 n 1, citing HathiTrust, 755 F3d at 94.

See HathiTrust, 902 F Supp at 451-55.
159 Klamath IrrigationDistrict v United States, 113 Fed Cl 688, 697 (2013).
158
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legal rights.160 Association members retain their own individual
right to sue, and they merely let the association bring a claim that
supports all its members' interests. Indeed, courts have often distinguished between these two types of standing issues.16i The two

positions can therefore be reconciled: When an individual wants
to assign the right to sue to whomever they desire, an ownership
interest in the copyright must be provided too. When a copyright
holder wants only to have a party represent her interests in a suit
without giving up any legal interests in the copyright, the question becomes whether the chosen representative in question has
his own right to sue on behalf of the copyright holder. This depends on whether the relationship in question justifies the third
party acting as a representative. Thus, the restriction on assignee
standing does not necessarily preclude all third-party standing,
especially given that associational standing "rebut[s] the background presumption . .. that litigants [in this case, the association
in question] may not assert the rights of absent third parties."162

The formal differences between assignee standing and associational standing also mean that associational standing does not
face many of the same issues as assignee standing. This makes
much of the rationale for precluding assignee standing inapplicable to associational standing. First, there are restraints on associational standing when there are major conflicts of interest between the association's lawsuit and its members' interests.163 A
court has flexibility in such situations: it can "consider whether
other approaches less drastic than denying group standing could
protect the interests of the members from the dangers presented
by this conflict," or it can deny standing outright.164 The potential
for court oversight reduces the concern that the association might

160 See Part I.B.
161 See, for example, Connecticut State Dental Association v Anthem Health Plans,

Inc,

591 F3d 1337, 1353-54 (11th Cir 2009) (rejecting the argument that an association
has no standing because it did not receive an assignment from its members); Waterfall
Homeowners Associationv Viega, Inc, 283 FRD 571, 579 (D Nev 2012) ("Homeowners could
assign their claims to an association outright, obviating the representational standing
issue, but that does not appear to be the case here.").
162 United Food, 517 US at 557.
163 See PolaroidCorp v Disney, 862 F2d 987, 999 (3d Cir 1988) ("[A]ssociational standing has never been granted in the presence of serious conflicts of interest either among the
members of an association or between an association and its members."). See also note 50
and accompanying text.
164 Retired Chicago Police Association v City of Chicago, 76 F3d 856, 865 (7th Cir
1996) (quotation marks omitted).
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not act as a good representative for the copyright owners' interests. In contrast, once a legal claim is properly assigned, the assignees are considered independent of the assignor and can do as
they wish in court. 165 If a copyright owner assigns his right to sue
to another party, that party has complete control over the legal
claims, without providing any insurance of adequate representation. An association, however, is merely suing on behalf of its
members, allowing the court to monitor whether the association's
claim is representative of its members' interests.
Second, the "individual participation" inquiry of the associational standing test (that is to say, the third prong) acts as a
screen for situations in which it is improper to aggregate claims
into a single party, a restriction that does not exist for the assignment of claims. In other words, if a claim is assignable, there is
nothing stopping a group of people from assigning their claims to
any single person, regardless of whether it is appropriate. On the
other hand, the third prong of the associational standing test
allows the court to "focus I] on the administrative convenience of
pursuing a case prosecuted by an associational representative"
when deciding whether the party can bring claims on behalf of the
group.1 66 If a court decides associational standing is inappropriate
in a certain situation, it has the flexibility to deny standing under
this prong, which minimizes opportunistic behavior. For example,
an association cannot just recruit a handful of members in order
to pursue a claim of its choosing or to allow its members to get
around other procedural requirements, such as those for class
actions.1 67 With assignee standing, on the other hand, such judicial controls are unavailable.168

165 See American Society for Testing & Materials v Corrpro Companies, Inc, 292 F
Supp 2d 713, 718 (ED Pa 2003) ("Where an assignment is effective, the assignee stands in
the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of his rights.").
166 In re PharmaceuticalIndustryAverage Wholesale PriceLitigation, 277 FRD 52, 62
(D Mass 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
167 See, for example, Telecommunications Research & Action Center on Behalf of
Checknoff v Allnet Communication Services, Inc, 806 F2d 1093, 1095-96 (DC Cir 1986)
(Ginsburg) (rejecting associational standing because only five to six association members
were involved and because the suit seemed like an attempt to get around the requirements
for a class action).
168 See id at 1097-98 (Bork concurring) (arguing that if a party wanted to avoid the
restraints on associational standing, it could either pursue a class action or assign its
rights to the association). See also Paoloni v Goldstein, 200 FRD 644, 647-48 (D Colo 2001)
("Judge Bork recognized that the association could avoid associational standing concerns
if members assigned the association their rights.").
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Finally, to the extent that there is unease at the idea of a
market for copyright infringement claims,169 there is little potential for such a market if associational standing is allowed. Copyright holders cannot just sell their individual claim to any association without any further ties; the holder must actually be an
association member, and the association must satisfy the Hunt
test. There is also little risk that associations will "buy" individuals
(that is, entice individuals to join the group) to gain their claims.
The decision to litigate is based on whether the suit will benefit
its membership as a whole, not just the interests of a few selected
members. For one, the claim has to protect interests that are
"germane to the organization's purpose,"170 so this would assumedly preclude claims that were motivated purely by the association's financial interest.171 In addition, the large majority of claims

that will be allowed under associational standing will be for injunctive and declaratory relief.172 This minimizes the importance
of any one claim. An association has little reason to spend undue
resources on an individual's claim when that claim will likely
neither result in monetary relief from which the association can
directly benefit nor have a large impact on a claim for injunctive
relief that is based on the collective membership interest. This is
especially true when courts have the power to block an association's

169 This was perceived as one of the concerns of the Silvers majority. See Silvers, 402
F3d at 905 (Bea dissenting) ("[T]he underlying premise upon which the Majority relies is
that there should not be an aftermarket in causes of action for copyright infringement.").
The concern would be that, as one amicus argued, "a market develop[s] in which speculators with no relationship to the copyrighted work pay a small sum . .. in exchange for the
ability to pursue a high volume of nuisance settlements or unwarranted jury verdicts." Id
at 904 n 12 (Bea dissenting). Arguably, though, this is not even an issue because "the
market will account for the fact that a copyright holder is selling accrued causes of action
and not the underlying copyright." Id at 905 (Bea dissenting).
170 Hunt, 432 US at 343. This is the second prong of the Hunt test.
171 Though there is not much guidance from the Supreme Court on the application of
the second prong of the Hunt test, see Retired Chicago Police Association, 76 F3d at 607
("This second prong has received little elaboration by the Supreme Court."), there is case
law that interprets this prong as requiring "an organization's litigation goals be pertinent
to its special expertise and the grounds that bring its membership together," Humane
Society of the United States v Hodel, 840 F2d 45, 56 (DC Cir 1988), and as "ensur[ing] a
modicum of concrete adverseness by reconciling membership concerns and litigation topics
by preventing associations from being merely law firms with standing," id at 58.
172 See note 44 and accompanying text. The PROs discussed in Part J.D offer a unique
example in which monetary relief might be available for associations, but that is because
of the unique representative capacity in which PROs act for their members. And even
there, the PROs do not seek out individuals based on current claims, but rather compete
for general membership based on membership terms.
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suit when the aggregation is inappropriate or when the association's suit conflicts with its members' interests. Given these
reasons, there is little, if any, risk that individual claims will be
auctioned to the highest bidder.
Thus, the restriction on assignee standing does not provide
guidance on the associational standing issue. At the very least,
the standing provision of the Copyright Act's relationship to associational standing should be interpreted and examined specifically without heavy reliance on the assignee standing cases.
B.

The Errors of the Courts That Reject Associational Standing

The courts that rejected associational standing do not provide
persuasive interpretations of the Copyright Act in regard to
whether the statute allows for associational standing. The HathiTrust courts based their conclusions on cases (ABKCO, Eden
Toys, Silvers) that did not deal with associational standing, but
rather with assignee standing.173 As described in the preceding
Section, such cases are not very persuasive on this issue. In addition, the Second Circuit missed one of the key points of ABKCO
because it took a sentence from the opinion out of context. ABKCO
discussed whether a party that purchased a copyright acquired
the right to bring an infringement claim on any previously accrued causes of action.174 The Second Circuit in HathiTrustquoted
the case for the proposition that "the Copyright Act does not permit copyright holders to choose third parties to bring suits on
their behalf."175 In ABKCO, however, this sentence was itself a
reference to Eden Toys, and it came in a paragraph that merely
described the background law in regard to standing under the
Copyright Act.176 The actual analysis done by the ABKCO court is
at odds with the simple proposition that ownership is always required to bring a copyright claim. Indeed, according to the
ABKCO court, "ABKCO's right to bring the claims arises not out
of its ownership of the copyright, but from its ownership of the
claims themselves which it purchased."177 Therefore, a more accurate reading is that, though a copyright holder cannot just choose

See Part H.A.
174 See ABKCO, 944 F2d at 980. The discussion was one topic in a complicated appeal
regarding the payment of damages over a previous finding of copyright infringement.
175 See HathiTrust, 755 F3d at 94 (quotation marks omitted), quoting ABKCO, 944
F2d at 980.
176 See ABKCO, 944 F2d at 980, citing Eden Toys, 697 F2d at 32 n 3.
177 ABKCO, 944 F2d at 981.
173
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any third party to bring a copyright claim on his behalf (which is
true even with regard to representative suits given that the chosen
representative must meet certain requirements), copyright
ownership is not necessarily essential to standing.178 This reading
of ABKCO makes the HathiTrust opinions unpersuasive.
The issue brought up by AIME-that copyright infringement
suits will always require the individual participation of the copyright owner and so will always fail the Hunt test179-is also inapt.

The district court relied on Marder v Lopez80 for the proposition
that individual copyright owners' participation is required,181 yet
Marder only deals in relevant part with how a plaintiff must
establish copyright ownership for a copyright infringement
claim.182 Though sometimes copyright ownership will be challenged to the extent that individuals will have to prove their ownership, this does not necessarily preclude associational standing
in all cases. There are cases in which association members have
suffered from an alleged infringer's activities but the ownership
of the copyrights at issue are not challenged.183 In such cases, the
only issue would be whether the alleged infringers violated at
least one exclusive right, which does not necessarily require individual participation given that the focus would be on the alleged
infringers' actions rather than on the members' actions. Even if
ownership is challenged, for members "who still own all or part of
the copyright to their work," individual participation is not
required to prove the first element of a copyright infringement
claim, as that information is publicly available on the United
States Copyright Office's Registry.184 Only if the members are
beneficial owners would some individual participation be required. As the Google court reasoned, though, even that limited

178 See also Silvers, 402 F3d at 911 (Bea dissenting) ("Thus, under the holding in
ABKCO, ownership of the copyright is not a requirement for the enforcement of accrued
claims assigned to the assignee (ABKCO) so long as the claims arose during the period
when the assignor (Bright Tunes) was the owner of the copyright.").
179 See AIME, 2011 WL 7447148 at *4.
180 450 F3d 445 (9th Cir 2006).
181 See AIME, 2011 WL 7447148 at *4.
182 See Marder, 450 F3d at 453. The plaintiff in the case could not establish copyright
ownership because the plaintiff signed a release that discharged the defendants from
liability. See id.
183 See CBS Broadcasting, Inc v EchoStar Communications Corp, No 98-2651, slip op
at 12 (SD Fla Mar 31, 2003) (stating that there is undisputed testimony that each station
has a license, and that the members of the associations at issue are these stations).
184 Google, 282 FRD at 390.
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amount of participation would not necessarily defeat associational standing, especially given that "[t]he alternative-forcing
association members to pursue their claims individually-would
be burdensome and inefficient" in certain situations.185
In addition, though the AIME court noted that the scope of
the relief will be limited by the individual members' copyrights,186
this again depends on the type of relief requested. As the Supreme
Court held in United Food, "'individual participation' is not normally necessary when an association seeks prospective or injunctive relief for its members."187 An association can request an injunction that prevents the alleged infringer from using
association members' copyrights in a manner that would not require individualized participation. For example, the association
could request the alleged infringer stop its activities with respect
to works that association members have registered with the association, and nothing more exactly the type of relief requested by
the associational plaintiffs in Google.188
Finally, as the district court noted in Google, "the third Hunt
prong is not an Article III standing requirement; it is prudential,"
which gives courts discretion in deciding whether to grant associational standing when "the first two prongs are met."189 Thus, the
third prong should not be used to reject associational standing
outright, especially if there are other considerations that prove to
be persuasive. It may be that, though some limited amount of
individual participation will be practically required in the case,
other equitable reasons weigh in favor of granting standing. Depending on the level of scrutiny applied, a court can tolerate some
amount of individual participation if it believes it is just to do so.
This is similar to what the Google district court did.190 Satisfying
Id.
See AIME, 2011 WL 7447148 at *4.
187 United Food, 517 US at 546.
188 See Google, 282 FRD at 391.
189 Id. See also In re PharmaceuticalIndustryAverage Wholesale Price Litigation, 277
FRD at 62:
185
186

[O]nce an association has satisfied the first two prongs of the associational
standing test, a court can be assured of "adversarial vigor in pursuing a claim
for which member Article III standing exists," and the third question focuses on
the "administrative convenience" of pursuing a case prosecuted by an associational representative.
190 See Google, 282 FRD at 391 (reasoning that "[e]ven if there were room for disagreement over whether the third Hunt prong has been met in this case, associational standing
would still be appropriate," and then exploring the equitable reasons for why the associations in the case should have standing).
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the third prong should be a case-by-case determination, so associational standing should not be precluded under the Copyright
Act as a matter of law.
C.

Application of Statutory Interpretation Principles

Traditional principles of statutory interpretation show that
associational standing should be allowed under the Copyright
Act, especially given that the cases rejecting assignee standing
are unpersuasive. First, this Comment explores the common-law.
presumption for applying background standing doctrine. Then, it
explains why it is appropriate to follow this presumption.
1. There is a common-law presumption in statutory
interpretation to apply background standing doctrine.
There is a long-standing presumption that "Congress is
understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles."191 Though a clear statement from Congress
is not necessarily required to overcome this presumption,192 plain

statements are required for "the protection of weighty and constant
values."193 In the context of standing principles, the Supreme Court
has said that "Congress legislates against the background of our
prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly
negated"194 and that "[i]n no event [ ] may Congress abrogate the
Art[icle] III minima [for standing]."195 The Court has also directly
recognized the importance of standing doctrine.196 Indeed, the doctrine of associational standing satisfies both constitutional and
prudential standing requirements, and there is no reason to expect that Congress did not intend for normal standing principles

191 Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Association v Solimino, 501 US 104, 108 (1991).
See also Isbrandtsen Co v Johnson, 343 US 779, 783 (1952) ("Statutes which invade the
common law .. . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established
and familiar principles.").
192 See Astoria, 501 US at 108.
193 Id.
194 Bennett v Spear, 520 US 154, 163 (1997).
195 Gladstone Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91, 100 (1979). See also note 27
and accompanying text.
196 See Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 750 (1984) ('The Art. III doctrine that requires a
litigant to have 'standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most
important of these [justiciability] doctrines."), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark
International,Inc v Static Control Components, Inc, 134 S Ct 1377, 1387-88 (2014).
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to apply under the Copyright Act, especially when there is no explicit restriction of standing to individual copyright holders.197
The Supreme Court has even stated that associational standing
represents a relationship that is "sufficient to rebut the background presumption (in the statutory context, about Congress's
intent) that litigants may not assert the rights of absent third
parties," which removes the typical barrier to representational
standing. 198

This principle, that common-law standing doctrine applies
unless otherwise negated, is available here, regardless of the reluctance shown in Silvers to apply common-law standing doctrine
in intellectual property cases.1 99 The Silvers court's conclusory
statement that there is "a presumption that, when we consider
standing under a statutory scheme involving intellectual property, common law doctrine does not apply" has many issues.200 The

case on which Silvers relies to establish this "presumption,"
Crown Die & Tool Co v Nye Tool & Machine Works,201 dealt in
relevant part only with whether a patent owner can assign the
right to litigate a patent infringement claim to an assignee, which
does not involve representational standing doctrine.22 The language in Crown Die that deals with applying the common law to
intellectual property states only that "[p]atent property is the
creature of statute law and its incidents are equally so and
depend upon the construction to be given to the statutes creating
it and them, in view of the policy of Congress in their enactment"203 and that "no [patent] rights can be acquired in it unless
authorized by statute, and in the manner the statute prescribes."204 Though the Court does say that a patent owner cannot
assign the right to sue to one person and assign the patent to another person, 205 there is no reason to expand this conclusion to
omit common-law standing doctrine in general. Indeed, the
Crown Die Court never even had the opportunity to consider the
implications of its stance in regard to associational standing,
197 See Silvers, 402 F3d at 885 ("The statute does not say expressly that only a legal
or beneficial owner of an exclusive right is entitled to sue.").
198 United Food, 517 US at 557.
199 See Silvers, 402 F3d at 885 ("Copyright is a creature of statute, so we will not
lightly insert common law principles that Congress has left out.").
200 Id at 888.
201 261 US 24 (1923).
202 See id at 38-40.
203 Id at 40.
204 Id (quotation marks omitted).
205 See Crown Die, 261 US at 44.
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because the decision predates associational standing by more
than a half century. 206 Nothing requires reading it as "effectively
creat[ing] a presumption" against all common-law standing doctrine,207 which might explain why Silvers is the only opinion that
has cited Crown Die for such a presumption.
In addition, many major developments in intellectual property law actually involve importing common-law principles into
these statutory regimes, which weighs against interpreting
Crown Die as requiring a hard line against common-law standing
doctrine.208 In particular, the manner in which the Supreme Court
imported contributory liability into the copyright regime shows
that courts should read in common-law principles into the
Copyright Act when applicable. The landmark case of Sony
Corporationof America v Universal City Studios, Inc,209 involving
the home-recording feature of video tape recorders, imported
contributory liability into the Copyright Act-despite the fact
that "[tihe Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable
for infringement committed by another."210 Part of its reasoning
for allowing such a claim was that "vicarious liability is imposed
in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory
infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another."211 This rationale could
likewise be extended to associational standing doctrine. Associational standing has been applied in a wide variety of cases and
statutory schemes.212 In addition, associational standing "is
merely a species" of representational standing, which "identif[ies]

See text accompanying note 34.
Silvers, 402 F3d at 888.
208 See also id at 895 (Berzon dissenting) ("I do not find the majority's reliance on
Crown Die persuasive in the current circumstances.... I find no support for such a broad
statement [that there is a presumption against common-law standing doctrine], given the
significant changes to copyright law since Crown Die was decided.") (citation omitted).
209 464 US 417 (1984).
210 Id at 434-35.
211 Id at 435.
212 See generally, for example, Associationof American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc v
Texas Medical Board, 627 F3d 547 (5th Cir 2010) (holding that the plaintiff association
had associational standing under 42 USC § 1983 for relief against constitutional violations); Oregon Advocacy Center v Mink, 322 F3d 1101 (9th Cir 2003) (holding that a law
office had associational standing on behalf of incapacitated criminal defendants under the
Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act of 1986); Pennsylvania Psychiatric
Society v Green Spring Health Services, Inc, 280 F3d 278 (3d Cir 2002) (holding that the
association could have standing under ERISA to bring a claim on members' behalf).
206
207
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the circumstances in which it is just" to allow litigants to assert
the rights of absent third parties.213
Thus, common-law standing principles such as associational
standing should not be precluded in copyright infringement cases
as a first principle. Rather, their application should depend on
whether Congress addressed them in the Copyright Act. If the
Copyright Act is silent on these standing issues, then background
common-law standing doctrine should apply.
2. Applying background standing doctrine is appropriate in
this context.
The text of the statute does not preclude the presumption to
apply common-law standing doctrine. Though one could argue
that Congress clearly meant to restrict associational standing in
§ 501(b) by expressly listing only legal and beneficial ownersexpressio unius est exclusio alterius-thatprinciple is unpersuasive here. For one, the listing of specific types of parties able to
bring a suit has not stopped associational standing from being applied in other contexts. 214 Second, this principle is just "an aid to
construction, not a rule of law."215 It applies only in cases in which
it is fair to say that Congress meant for the exclusion to apply.216
In the context of associational standing, there is no reason to
think that Congress considered whether organizations can bring
copyright infringement claims on behalf of their members and

Sony, 464 US at 435.
214 See, for example, Southern Illinois Carpenters Welfare Fund v Carpenters Welfare
Fund of Illinois, 326 F3d 919, 922 (7th Cir 2003) ("[W]e do not think that by confining the
right to sue ... to plan participants and beneficiaries Congress intended to prevent unions
from suing on behalf of participants."). The statute in that case merely stated that "[a]
civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary." 29 USC § 1132(a)(1). See also
Small v General Nutrition Companies, Inc, 388 F Supp 2d 83, 95-96 (EDNY 2005) (rejecting the argument that Congress intended the Americans with Disabilities Act to preclude
associational standing when the statute in question, 42 USC § 12188(a)(1), states only
that standing is given to any person who was subjected to discrimination on the basis of
disability or to any person who has reasonable grounds to believe that such discrimination
is about to happen).
215 United States v Castro, 837 F2d 441, 443 n 2 (11th Cir 1988), quoting 73 Am Jur
2d Statutes § 121.
216 See Marx v GeneralRevenue Corp, 568 US 371, 381 (2013) (quotation marks and
citations omitted):
213

We have long held that the expressio unius canon does not apply unless it is fair
to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say
no to it, and that the canon can be overcome by contrary indications that adopting a particular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any exclusion.
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rejected that possibility, especially in light of how little this provision was discussed in the legislative reports. Both the House
and Senate Reports state only:
Subsection (b) of section 501 enables the owner of a particular right to bring an infringement action in that owner's
name alone, while at the same time insuring to the extent
possible that the other owners whose rights may be affected
are notified and given a chance to join the action.217
Though this language might clarify that the owner of each particular right has the right to sue, the reports provide little guidance
on how to interpret the statute in light of associational standing
doctrine.218 An association bringing a suit on behalf of its members
is not claiming to have any right in the copyright itself.219 Rather,
it is effectively bringing a single action that represents its various
members' rights, providing its members (the actual copyright
owners) with the benefits described above. The fact that similar
listings of parties have not precluded associational standing in
other contexts and that there is no reason to think Congress even
considered this issue outweigh applying the expressio unius
principle here to preclude associational standing. Because of this,
courts should instead follow the presumption that common-law
standing doctrine, specifically associational standing, applies.
Supporting the application of this presumption is the principle that "the Copyright Act must be construed in light of [its] basic
purpose [to stimulate artistic creativity]."220 Allowing associational standing furthers this goal. Though Congress intended only
a limited monopoly over copyrighted material, allowing associations to bring suits on behalf of their members does not broaden
the substantive rights in the work. Rather, it merely creates efficiencies in enforcing the rights already conferred. Specifically,
associational standing allows litigants to take advantage of the
"pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital" of the given association and provides a straightforward method for litigating
217 HR Rep No 94-1476, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 159 (1976), reprinted in 1976 USCCAN
5659, 5775; Copyright Law Revision, S Rep No 94-473, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 141 (1975).
218 This is especially true given that the foundational case for modern associational
standing doctrine, Warth, was decided in 1975, a year before the language in 17 USC
§ 501(b) was enacted into law. See generally Warth, 422 US 490. See also Copyright Act of
1976 § 501(b), 90 Stat at 2584, 17 USC § 501(b).
219 See Klamath Irrigation District, 113 Fed Cl at 697 ("[I]t is well-accepted that
associational standing does not stem from any actual assignment of rights, but hinges on
the relationship between the association and the interests of its members.").
220 Sony, 464 US at 432.
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group interests without forcing individual suits or going through
the complex requirements for class actions.221 Though this might
expand the monopoly over the copyright in the sense that it offers
another procedural avenue to assert these rights, the idea of the
"limited monopoly" is about the appropriate scope of public access
to the work.222 Expanding the ways in which a copyright holder
can enforce the copyright does not impact the extent of public
access. Rather, it just offers a new way to police the access already
conferred. Indeed, sometimes this might be necessary for practical enforcement of the copyright, as seen in the case of PROs discussed in Part I.D. Associations, like the PROs of the music industry, allow for economies of scale that justify enforcement
against instances of copyright infringement that would not make
sense for an individual copyright holder to pursue, and this benefits the copyright system as a whole.223 Thus, the common-law presumption that associational standing applies should control here.
D.

Policy Justifications

There are also two main policy reasons to allow associational
standing under the Copyright Act. First, allowing associational
standing provides unique benefits as compared to class actions
and improves judicial economy in mass infringement suits. Second,
associational standing serves as an efficient sorting mechanism
for copyright holders who want to come together to litigate mass
infringement.
1. Associational standing creates benefits for both sides of
a mass copyright infringement suit.
Associational standing provides for mass representation in a
way that creates unique benefits and avoids many of the pitfalls
of the other primary mass representation lawsuit mechanism, the
class action. Both sides benefit from avoiding enlarged class action
litigation expenses: plaintiffs avoid dealing with the complexity
of class certification requirements, and defendants know who
they are dealing with at the litigation's outset rather than estimating liability based on an amorphous class of some unfixed
221 Brock, 477 US at 289-90.
222 Sony, 464 US at 429.
223 See BroadcastMusic, Inc v Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc, 441 US 1, 20-21
(1979) (describing how a blanket public performance license was necessary in the music
industry to avoid thousands of individual negotiations, and that a performing rights society
"provides the necessary resources for blanket sales and enforcement").
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size. This promotes the availability of settlement options.224 In
addition, if it is just the association that is bringing the claim and
there is no class action, the parties can settle without having to
meet the requirements of FRCP 23(e), which is what undermined
the attempted settlement agreement in Google.225 Even if the
plaintiffs still desire to pursue a class action, associational standing can complement the class action process by having an association serve as one of the class representatives, which ensures the
members' interests are directly litigated rather than being indirectly resolved as part of the class action. This is discussed in the
following paragraph.226 Judicial economy is also saved by avoiding
the long and complicated issues involved in class actions. For example, there is no need to certify a class when the association
brings a claim only for its members, as the group to be represented is already defined. The Supreme Court also recognized
that the specialized expertise and resources of associations "can
assist both courts and plaintiffs" and can ensure the "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions."227 Though there might be a fear that associational standing

will allow litigants to avoid the procedural requirements for class
actions, courts have the ability to screen out improper attempts
at aggregation that are meant to circumvent these requirements,
as discussed in Part III.A.228

The district-court opinion in Google shows how associational
standing can be desirable in the context of a class action. In deciding to allow associational standing for the associational representatives in the class action, the district court considered how
"[t]he alternative-forcing association members to pursue their
claims individually-would be burdensome and inefficient."229

The court also noted how the association had provided those benefits that the Supreme Court described in Brock, arguing that
"the Authors Guild has played an integral part in every stage of
224 If an association settles a claim on behalf of its members, then claim preclusion
principles should apply, though it is a complicated issue. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
225 See Authors Guild v Google, Inc, 770 F Supp 2d 666, 669-70, 677 (SDNY 2011)
(denying the settlement agreement in part because it "contemplates an arrangement that
exceeds what the Court may permit under Rule 23").
226 See also note 33 and accompanying text (discussing how an association can be a
class representative in a class action).
227 Brock, 477 US at 289.
228 See notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
229 Google, 282 FRD at 390.
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this litigation."230 It concluded that, because Google did not conduct an "individualized evaluation" as to whether its use of each
work was fair use but rather "treated the copyright holders as a
group, the copyright holders should be able to litigate on a group
basis."231 Instead of letting only the individual plaintiffs carry on
with the suit, the court believed that the Authors Guild brought
a unique benefit to the case, and so allowed it to continue participating as a party.
The efficiency that associational standing provides-that is,
avoiding multiple nonexpert plaintiffs bringing almost indistinguishable individual suits by providing the ability to litigate
group interests as a single, expert party with preexisting resources-is especially important given that the legal system does
prevent inefficient lawsuits when more efficient options are available. For example, courts disallow certain types of class actions
when there are more efficient litigation options.232 This concern
for efficiency means that we should promote efficient litigation
mechanisms over inefficient mechanisms. Applying this to the
context of associational standing, the law should encourage litigants to take advantage of the efficiency created by associational
standing rather than rely on less-efficient individual suits or class
actions that preclude parties with more experience and resources
from taking part.
2. Associational standing serves as an efficient sorting
mechanism for mass infringement suits.
The value of associational standing as a sorting mechanism
for mass infringement suits is shown by the model provided by
Professor Eugene Kontorovich to analyze standing.233 He proposes
that entitlements are generally "negative," in that they allow the
230 Id at 391, citing Brock, 477 US at 289.
231 Google, 282 FRD at 391.
232 See, for example, FRCP 23(b)(3) ("A class action may be maintained if... the court
finds ... that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy."); General Telephone Co of the Southwest v Falcon, 457 US
147, 159 (1982) (rejecting class certification because "the maintenance of respondent's action as a class action did not advance 'the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a
principal purpose of the procedure"').
233 See generally Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 Va L Rev 1663
(2007). Though Kontorovich focused on constitutional entitlements, he also pointed out
that "[a]s a positive matter, the analysis of standing's consequences for statutory rights is
much the same as for constitutional entitlements." Id at 1720. Because this Comment is
only concerned with the positive implications of his framework, it does not consider the
normative implications for statutory entitlements that he proposes. See id at 1720-23.
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entitlement holder to be free of certain kinds of action.234 The
values individuals attach to these entitlements, however, differ:
the value is the difference between the welfare derived from the
action that the entitlement prevents W and the cost of challenging
the action in court C.235 The value of the entitlement to the individual, therefore, is W

-

C.236

To simplify the discussion for this

Comment, only W will be relevant.
An example shows how this analysis works. Say there are two
people, X and Y, who have a musical composition copyright in a
song. One of the exclusive rights included in the copyright is the
right to publicly perform the musical work.237 X, an established
songwriter, loses $100 when someone publicly performs his copyrighted song without permission, making his W = -$100. He represents a "negative value" entitlement holder, who would have a
welfare loss if the action prevented by the entitlement, in this case
the performance of his song without his permission, occurs. 238 Y,
an amateur songwriter, actually gains $100 when someone performs his song without permission (he values the exposure more
than any license he could get). His W is $100, making him a
"positive value" entitlement holder, which means he has a welfare
gain and a positive W if the song is played without his permission.39
Now say there are two associations, the Pay Guild and the
Free Guild. The Pay Guild believes everyone should pay to perform its members' musical composition copyrights and will seek
injunctions against those who perform the songs but do not pay. 2 40
The Free Guild, however, wants its members' works to be exposed
to the public, and so it promotes the free public performance of
those works.241 Thus, X, a negative-value entitlement holder,
would join the Pay Guild, and Y, a positive-value entitlement
holder, would join the Free Guild, given that copyright holders
are free to join whatever associations they want and assumedly
would join only associations that are in line with their interests.
234 See id at 1676.
235 See id.
236 Note that "C [] is always a negative number," and "Wmay be positive or negative." Id.
237 See 17 USC § 106(4).
238 Kontorovich, 93 Va L Rev at 1676 (cited in note 233).
239 See id. The existence of positive-value entitlement holders rests on the idea that
legal injury is different from actual harm; a legal injury can cause a harm or benefit
depending on how the person views or feels about the injury. See id at 1676-77.
240 Examples of real-life "Pay Guilds" include PROs and the Authors Guild.
241 Though a real-life "Free Guild" is hard to find, a formal organization is not required to understand this analysis. For example, the authors who did not join the Authors
Guild in the opening hypothetical could be seen as a "Free Guild."
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For simplicity, assume the Pay Guild and Free Guild both have
ten members each, and so, if we take the sums of each member's
W in each association, the Pay Guild's W is -$1000 and the Free
Guild's W is $1000.
As a final element, say a bar plays songs from members of
both guilds every night. Because the Pay Guild's W is a larger
negative number than X's W, it is the better litigant, as it has the
most at stake (and besides, X will benefit if the Pay Guild wins).242
In addition, if the Pay Guild brings a lawsuit for its members, that
does not affect the ability of the bar to play the songs of the Free
Guild members, because copyrights are discrete units. Whatever
enforcement the Pay Guild seeks for its members' copyrights does
not affect what happens with the Free Guild members' copyrights.
In other words, the Pay Guild's members can remedy their loss in
the most efficient manner, while the Free Guild's members can
still retain their benefit, leading to the ideal situation. This reflects the real-life position of performing rights societies, as described above.
Thus, by allowing associational standing in mass copyright
infringement suits, courts will be allowing an ideal plaintiff to
bring the claims, with little risk of affecting the rights of other,
positive-value entitlement holders who wish to be kept separate
from the litigation. Rather than try to define the relevant group
in court through the class certification process-which in this situation might run into issues of defining an appropriate class
given that there are copyright holders who could benefit from the
alleged infringement243-associational standing lets the copyright
holders freely sort themselves into the relevant groups that will
promote their interests.
CONCLUSION

Associational standing is an important part of standing
doctrine that provides unique benefits to litigants. Because the
text of the Copyright Act does not resolve this question, courts
242 This fits Kontorovich's explanation that "[i]f members of the injured class all have
nonpositive values, and the principle relief sought is injunctive ... then a plaintiff with a
greater negative value may be a fine representative of the class." Kontorovich, 93 Va L
Rev at 1677 (cited in note 233). This does assume, however, that the association's members
share the same value type-that is, they are all nonpositive-value entitlement holders.
243 See Authors Guild, Inc v Google Inc, 721 F3d 132, 134 (2d Cir 2013) (noting that
Google's argument-that the proposed class might not be representative because there are
a large number of copyright holders who benefit from the alleged infringement-"may
carry some force").
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have offered differing positions on whether associational standing
is allowed. This Comment argues that the opinions that have
refused associational standing rested on erroneous reasoning. In
addition, traditional principles of statutory interpretation show
that the presumption in favor of applying associational standing
is not rebutted by the statutory text. Policy supports this interpretation, as associational standing can be seen as an effective
sorting mechanism for mass infringement suits and can provide
unique benefits that class actions do not offer. Therefore, courts
should allow associations to bring copyright infringement claims
on behalf of their members under the Copyright Act.

